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Abstract 
We present a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose 
between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings 
suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue sharing contract. 
This choice not only turns out to be the most efficient but at the same time is fair. Overall, the 
distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that under 
revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand with the use of monetary 
incentives. 
Keywords: incentive contract, bonus contract, trust, moral hazard, lab experiment 
JEL Classification: C91, J41, M52 
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appendices are available online. The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the 
experimental dataset is available from the first author. 
I. Introduction 
This paper employs an experiment to compare how principals choose among three different 
contract types: revenue sharing contracts, bonus contracts and trust contracts. Contract choice 
is clearly important from the perspective of the efficiency of any transactions that involves 
principals and agents, and yet to our knowledge only a limited number of experimental studies 
directly compare different types of contracts, and none has looked at the combinations of 
contracts we consider. We find revenue sharing contracts a particularly useful contract to 
consider as part of the menu of choices offered to the principal. Revenue sharing contracts are 
used extensively in sharecropping (Allen and Lueck, 1992), the video rental industry (Dana and 
Spier, 2001), gate revenue sharing in sports (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004), law, accounting 
and architecture firms (Greenwood and Empson, 2003), among other professions. These are 
evidently contracts of potentially general interest. 
In a trust contract, the principal pays a fixed wage to the agent and requests an effort level. As 
the fixed wage is paid before the agent decides on an effort level he has no incentive for exerting 
the requested effort. In the bonus contract, in addition to the fixed wage and requested effort, 
the principal announces a voluntary bonus she is willing to pay if the exerted effort is equal to 
or exceeds the requested effort. As this announcement is not binding, there is still no incentive 
to exert effort. However, Fehr et al. (2007) find that when offered the choice between an 
enforceable monitoring contract and a non-enforceable bonus contract, most principals (roughly 
90%) preferred the bonus contract. Additionally, the effort exerted by the agents and the average 
payoff for both the principals and the agents were higher in bonus contract than in monitoring 
contract settings (Fehr et. al., 2007).  Fehr et al.’s (2007) interpretation of their findings is that 
the bonus contract was preferred to the monitoring contract due to fairness concerns.  It is 
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possible however that a contract that contained the opportunity of fining could have been 
perceived as a hostile act itself and might send the agent a signal of distrust (see Dickinson and 
Villeval, 2008; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; and Frey, 1998).1 This in turn could have increased 
the likelihood to shirk by generating a self-fulfilling prophecy of distrust (see Bacharach et al., 
2007). In contrast, in an experiment employing revenue sharing contracts, where a principal 
defines a fixed wage and additionally offers the agent a share of the total (gross) revenue, 
Anderhub et al. (2002) found that principals “clearly recognize the agency problem and react 
accordingly” (p.24) by developing incentive compatible and profit maximizing contracts; 
however, a significant proportion of the principals also take concerns of fairness into account 
in the sense of providing larger than the predicted shares of the total revenue to the agents. In 
principle, a contract that ex ante reduces the risk for the principal could be quite attractive to a 
risk averse principal, and contracts based on revenue sharing or bonuses would not have the 
negative connotations of distrust of a monitoring contract with fines. 
Our experiment builds on the work of Anderhub et al. (2002) and Fehr et al. (2007) by providing 
principals the option to choose among a revenue sharing contract, a bonus contract or a trust 
contract.2 The trust and bonus contracts we used are similar to those in Fehr et al. (2007). In the 
revenue sharing contract a principal defines a non-negative fixed wage and additionally offers 
the agent a share of the total (gross) revenue. The revenue sharing contract implicitly assumes 
that effort and revenue are observable and verifiable. Although, under such circumstances, it 
would also be possible to write a ‘forcing contract’ which requires agents to exert the efficient 
effort level and punish them severely if they would deviate, offering such a contract may be 
                                                 
1 More generally, the contract choice may provide important information to the employee regarding the employer 
(e.g. Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or even the behavior of other employees (Danilov and Sliwka, 2013), which in turn 
may have either positive or negative effects on the intrinsic motives of agents. Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) 
provide a systematic review of what they identify as the four crowding out mechanisms of intrinsic incentives. 
2 As discussed more below, the trust contract may be seen as a special case of both the bonus and the revenue 
sharing contracts. However, we chose to present it as an explicit option to control for any potential pressure the 
principals may have felt on using all the mechanisms available in each contract (given they have chosen it).  
4 
 
perceived as a signal of distrust by the agents (irrespective of the preferences of the principal).3 
The revenue sharing contract allows fairness concerns to be expressed by offering a generous 
share of the total revenue to the agent. Hence, a principal can express social preferences in both 
the bonus contract and the revenue sharing contract if he or she chooses to do so.  
Our key finding is that principals tend to choose revenue sharing contracts over alternatives, in 
both one-shot and repeated games, and the revenue sharing contracts that they choose make 
agents on average no worse off in absolute terms than if a different contract had been chosen. 
In relative terms, agents overall received as much as 47% of the earnings. In the repeated games, 
switches from bonus contract or trust contracts to revenue sharing contracts are Pareto superior 
for a majority of both principals and agents. Therefore, efficiency and fairness complement 
each other.4  
Our results are, in spirit, connected to Chan (2006), who presented a trust game experiment 
showing that both efficiency and equity can matter, and to Güth et al. (1993), who devised a 
multi-period ultimatum game where efficiency and fairness can complement each other. 
Undoubtedly there are contexts where the tension rather than complementarity between 
efficiency and fairness is a real one (e.g. Ackert et al., 2007, and Bone et al., 2004). Our claim 
of complementarity is one that applies to a contract design environment where revenue sharing 
is an option. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical 
predictions, the experimental design and the hypotheses. Section 3 provides the results of the 
experiment. Section 4 offers a discussion of the results and section 5 concludes. Online 
                                                 
3 See Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) for a review of crowding out mechanisms on preferences. 
4 While following a different approach, there is some parallelism with Murdock (2002), who presents a model 
combining intrinsic incentives and efficiency in contract design. Conversely, Prendergast (2008) suggests selecting 
agents by their preferences. Other researchers have pointed out that monetary incentives might work, but that their 
effectiveness depends on the degree of the agents’ intrinsic motivation (Boly, 2010) or the size of the monetary 
incentives (James, 2005). 
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appendices include more details on experimental parameters and predictions (appendix A), 
experimental instructions (B) as well as more experimental results and further econometric 
analysis (C, D and E). 
II. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Experimental Design 
In our experiment a principal, the employer, hires an agent, the employee, to carry out 
production. For every unit of effort 𝑒𝑒 the agent exerts, the principal receives 150 Experimental 
Currency Units (ECU). In other words, the total revenue is given by 𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) = 150 ∗ 𝑒𝑒. The agent 
bears an effort cost of 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) = 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒2 with 𝑒𝑒 ∈  {0,1, … ,19,20}. Subjects have a fixed role of 
either principals or agents, and this was common knowledge.  The experiment is divided in 5 
games and has 10 rounds in total. In each round both the principal and the agent receive initial 
endowments of 3000 ECU. The purpose of the endowments was to ensure that neither the agent 
nor the principal could make any losses. The differences across games are in the type of 
employment contract the principal can offer to the agent, i.e. a trust contract, a bonus contract, 
a revenue sharing contract or a choice among the three, and whether the game is repeated 
(which allows for reputation building) or one-shot. In each game principals are matched with a 
different agent, and this is also common knowledge. Games are in one of two possible orders, 
described in Figure 1, and are explained below. 
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Figure 1: Sequential Structure of the Experiment 
Sessions 1-6 
Round 1 Round 2-7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 
TBR TBR-r TC-ex BC-ex RSC-ex 
 
Sessions 7-12 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5-10 
TC-ex BC-ex RSC-ex TBR TBR-r 
 
Notes: In the games TC-ex, BC-ex, and RSC-ex the contracts could not be chosen but were set exogenously to be 
a Trust, Bonus, and Revenue Sharing Contract, respectively. TBR and TBR-r represent a one-shot and repeated 
contract choice settings, respectively. 
 
In an exogenous trust contract setting (TC-ex) the principal chooses the size of a fixed wage 𝐹𝐹,  
where 𝐹𝐹 ∈  {0,1, … ,2999,3000}, and suggests an effort level to the agent which is not binding. 
Then the agent is informed about the offered contract and decides to accept or reject the 
contract. If the contract is rejected then both receive only their initial endowments of 3000 ECU. 
If the agent accepts the contract he receives the fixed wage and decides on an effort level. 
Afterwards, both the agent and the principal get informed about their earnings. 
In an exogenous bonus contract setting (BC-ex) the principal in addition to the fixed wage and 
suggested effort he or she announces the size of a non-binding bonus, 𝐵𝐵 where 𝐵𝐵 ∈ {0,1, … ,2999,3000},  he or she may pay to the agent if satisfied by his or her effort level. 
Afterwards, the agent is informed about the offered contract and if the contract is accepted 
decides on an effort level. After being informed about the agent’s effort level, the principal 
decides the bonus he or she wants to give to the agent, if any. Finally, both the agent and the 
principal get informed about their earnings. 
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In an exogenous revenue sharing contract setting (RSC-ex) the principal chooses the fixed 
wage, suggests an effort level and offers a share 𝑆𝑆 where 𝑆𝑆 ∈  {0.00, 0.01, … ,0.99,1.00} of the 
total (gross) revenue that will be given to the agent. Afterwards, the agent is informed about the 
offered contract and if he or she accepts the offered contract decides on an effort level. Finally, 
both the agent and the principal get informed about their earnings. 
In a one-shot Trust-Bonus-Revenue sharing game (TBR) there is an additional first step in 
which the principal can choose which of the 3 possible contracts to offer; the trust, the bonus 
or the revenue sharing contract. After the principal has chosen contract type he proceeds with 
selecting the parameters of the relevant contract and offers it to the agent as in the previous 
games. 
The repeated Trust-Bonus-Revenue sharing game (TBR-r) is identical to the TBR but is 
repeated for 6 rounds with the same co-player. 
Theoretical Predictions 
In the following, we derive hypotheses under two scenarios: (i) when the agent is self-interested 
and (ii) when the agent is inequality averse. Since the principal has a first-mover advantage, 
whether she is inequality averse or self-interested does not alter the theoretical predictions. 
Hence, in the following we assume that the principal is narrowly self-interested.   
The principal chooses between the three contracts, explained below, and makes an offer to the 
agent. If the agent accepts the contract he could then choose his desired effort level. Three 
different contract types are available to the principals: the trust contract (TC), the bonus contract 
(BC) and the revenue sharing contract (RSC).  The agent’s gross profit in the case of a TC, BC 
and RSC are respectively defined as: πTCA = F , πBCA = F + B and πRSCA = F + S ∗ R(e).  
For all three contract types, a narrowly self-interested agent will only accept a contract if he is 
at least not worse off by accepting it. Hence, the agent’s participation constraint can be written 
as 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) ≥ 0, where 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) is the transfer the principal needs to provide to the agent as 
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compensation for exerting effort at a cost 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒). As the principal wishes to minimize the transfer 
to induce participation, she will set it just large enough to make the agent participate to the 
contract, i.e. at the point where 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒). The principal’s profit is defined as 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) −
𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒), where 𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) is the total revenue generated and 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) the transfer to the agent. Given the 
revenue and cost functions introduced above, maximizing the principal’s profit with respect to 
𝑒𝑒 results in 𝑒𝑒 = 74.5. The experimental parameters only allow 𝑒𝑒 ∈  {0,1, … ,19,20}, and so this 
maximization problem has a corner solution of 𝑒𝑒∗ = 20.5 
Having identified the participation constraint and the profit maximizing effort level, the 
following step is to show why, given the assumption that both the principal and the agent are 
rational and narrowly self-interested, the only contract that can satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint is the RSC.6  
Replacing 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) with the revenue sharing contract’s specific transfer of 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝑆𝑆 ∗ 150𝑒𝑒 
results in the incentive compatibility constraint: ∀e: F + S ∗ 150e∗ − e∗ − e∗2 ≥ F + S ∗150e − e − e2. Given that the agent would exert an effort greater than zero if 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒∗) ≥ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒) 
is satisfied, the agent would, as a worst case accept, 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒∗) = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒). Maximizing the agent’s 
profit 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝑆𝑆 ∗ 150𝑒𝑒∗ − 𝑒𝑒∗ − 𝑒𝑒∗2 with respect to  𝑒𝑒∗, inserting the optimal effort level 
𝑒𝑒∗ = 20 and solving for 𝑆𝑆, results in S = 0.273̇, i.e. narrowly self-interested agents would react 
with 𝑒𝑒∗ = 20 to any share S ≥ 0.27. Hence, the principal will set S=0.27 and F=0. 
In a trust contract the principal offers the agent an unconditional fixed wage 𝐹𝐹 and suggests the 
agent to provide an effort level  𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠. However, if the agent accepts this offer, the suggested effort 
level 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 cannot be enforced by the principal. Consequently, the principal’s monetary payoff 
resulting from a trust contract 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶(𝐹𝐹, 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) is defined as R(e) − F, whereas the agent earns F −
                                                 
5 The decision to have a corner solution has been made deliberately expecting that it will be easier for subjects in 
the role of principals to identify e* if that is a corner than an interior point. In other words, the choice for a corner 
solution was made to reduce complexity. 
6 This assumes that both principals and agents are payoff maximizers.  
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C(e). Under the assumption of self-interest, the principal will never offer a positive fixed wage 
and the agent will never exert any effort. 
In a bonus contract, the principal offers a fixed wage 𝐹𝐹 and suggests an effort level 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠. 
However, differently from the TC, the principal also announces to pay a bonus 𝐵𝐵 ∈ {0,1, … ,2999,3000} if the agent delivers the suggested effort level. After the agent’s effort 
choice, the principal has the opportunity to pay the agent a voluntary bonus in addition to the 
fixed wage 𝐹𝐹. Neither the agent’s effort level 𝑒𝑒 nor the principal’s bonus payment 𝐵𝐵 are 
enforceable. In addition, the principal is not restricted by the initially announced bonus, i.e. she 
can pay a bonus smaller equal or larger to the one initially announced. Similar to above, if both 
principal and agent are self-interested the principal will never pay a fixed wage or bonus, and 
the agent will always choose an effort level of zero. 
Now we discuss inequity averse agents. In this paper we understand inequity averse agents to 
have a utility function as defined in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Note that this utility function 
defines an agent’s utility: 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 − 𝛼𝛼 ∙ max(𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴, 0) − 𝛽𝛽 ∙ max(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 − 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 , 0).   (1) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 and 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 denote the monetary payoffs for agents and principals, respectively. The 
parameters 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 describe the degree to which the agent dislikes being worse off and better 
off than the principal, respectively. 
For revenue sharing contracts, if the agent does not only care about his own but also about the 
principal’s income, the participation threshold for the share of 0.27 shifts upwards. Considering 
that both principals and agents would receive their endowments of 3000 ECU if no contract 
was formed, an agent would accept a contract and exert an effort greater than zero only if 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒 = 1),𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒 = 1)) > 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 3000,𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 = 3000). Since 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝑆𝑆 ∙ 150𝑒𝑒 −
𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒2 and 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 = 150𝑒𝑒 − 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆 ∙ 150𝑒𝑒 we can re-write the agent’s utility as 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝑆𝑆 ∙150𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝛼𝛼(150𝑒𝑒 − 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆 ∙ 150𝑒𝑒 − (𝐹𝐹 + 𝑆𝑆 ∙ 150𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒2)), with  
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FOC: 𝑒𝑒 = (300𝛼𝛼+150)𝑅𝑅−1−151𝛼𝛼
2𝛼𝛼+2
, and SOC: −2𝛼𝛼 − 2 < 0∀𝛼𝛼 > −1.   (2) 
Substituting the envy parameter 𝛼𝛼 = 1 we get the simpler FOC 𝑒𝑒 = (450𝑆𝑆 − 152) 4⁄ . 7 The 
participation constraint is satisfied if 𝑒𝑒 ≥ 1 which is the case for all shares 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0.343. Thus, if 
principals make offers to inequity averse agents, the minimum offered shared they can expect 
to be accepted and that consequently results in 𝑒𝑒 > 0 is 0.343.8 By calculating 𝑆𝑆 for 𝑒𝑒 = 20 in 
the FOC above we find that a principal, in order to ensure that the agent exerts an effort of 𝑒𝑒 =20, should set the offered share to 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0.52. Since the principal’s payoff linearly increases in 
𝑒𝑒 ∀𝑆𝑆 < 1, the principal’s payoff is also maximized by 𝑒𝑒 = 20, even if the agent is inequality 
averse.9  
For trust contracts, it is obvious that a payoff maximizing agent should respond with 𝑒𝑒 = 0 to 
the fixed wage 𝐹𝐹. However, if the agent is inequality averse this behavior of complete agent 
inactivity is no longer optimal; neither for the principal nor for the agent and there is scope for 
Pareto improvement. Since the agent is inequality averse (and thus dislikes earning less, and - 
to a lesser extent - also dislikes earning more than the principal), the agent will not free-ride on 
any positive fixed wage, but will choose his effort level according to any positive 𝐹𝐹. The 
principal anticipates this behavior by choosing 𝐹𝐹 such that the agent’s effort choice maximizes 
the principal’s payoff and thus  𝐹𝐹 = (149𝛽𝛽+151𝛼𝛼+2)𝑒𝑒−150𝛽𝛽+(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)𝑒𝑒2
2𝛼𝛼+2𝛽𝛽
.10      (3) 
                                                 
7 For example Blanco et al. (2011) estimate the parameter to be 𝛼𝛼 = 0.93, 𝛽𝛽 = 0.38 which is very close to Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) whose parameter distributions used means of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.85, 𝛽𝛽 = 0.32. 
8 Note that a Fehr-Schmidt utility function is non-differentiable at 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴. For finding the participation constraint 
we only consider the case of 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 as the payoff maximizing principal will always earn more than the inequity 
averse agent by choosing the contract parameters accordingly. 
9 The online appendix A also discusses predictions under the assumption of inequity averse agents using a utility 
function as proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002). The resulting predictions are qualitatively similar to the ones 
under a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function and are robust against a generous variation of the parameters 
reported in Charness and Rabin (2002).  
10 This value of 𝐹𝐹 indicates the threshold that makes agents indifferent between exerting 𝑒𝑒 or 𝑒𝑒 − 1∀𝑒𝑒 ≥ 1. It 
takes into account that agents dislike being worse off, but also being better off than principals. It also follows that 
inequity averse agents will accept any trust contract and produce 𝑒𝑒 > 0 for all 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 58. Thus, in contrast to pure 
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Substituting 𝛼𝛼 = 1,𝛽𝛽 = 0.35 and (since it makes the payoff maximizing principal always best 
off) 𝑒𝑒 = 20 results in the optimal offer: 𝐹𝐹 = 1701. 
For bonus contracts, similarly to trust contracts, if the agent is inequity averse, a self-interested 
principal would pay a fixed wage of 1701 ECU and the agent will best respond with an effort 
of 20. Furthermore, the principal will not pay a bonus, i.e. 𝐵𝐵 = 0. 
Regarding the choice between trust contract and bonus contract, using a bonus contract allows 
the principal to reduce the risk she faces from a shirking agent (Fehr et al., 2007), for instance 
by paying half now and half after effort is observed. Consequently, principals may prefer bonus 
contracts to trust contracts. A complementary intuition stems from the fact that the TC is a 
subset of the BC; that is, a principal could always choose the BC and pay solely a fixed wage. 
Therefore, choosing the BC provides greater flexibility to the principal. 
Hypotheses 
 below provides a summary of the theoretical predictions for each of the three contracts, under 
the assumptions of: a) both principal and agent are self-interested, and b) the principal is self-
interested but the agent inequity averse. Under the assumption of self-interest, the revenue 
sharing contract is the only contract that can be devised in an incentive compatible manner. In 
the one-shot bonus or trust contracts there is a zero fixed wage, zero effort and (in the case of 
the bonus contract) a zero bonus. Conversely, by choosing a suitable revenue share for the 
agent, the agent puts in more effort and both principal and agent earn higher profits. In addition, 
even if the agent is inequity averse, the revenue sharing contract remains the most suitable 
choice for the principal. Consequently, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 1: Principals prefer the revenue sharing contract over the bonus or trust contracts. 
                                                 
payoff maximizing agents where trust and bonus contracts can never satisfy the participation constraint, both 
contracts can satisfied it for inequity averse agents. 
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Hypothesis 2: Agents provide more effort, and therefore the revenue will be higher, in revenue 
sharing contracts than in bonus or trust contracts. 
Hypothesis 3: In bonus contracts, principals will not meet their announced bonus payments (if 
any). 
Hypothesis 4: In revenue sharing contracts, principals offer incentive compatible contracts, 
and specifically the lowest feasible incentive compatible share of 0.27. 
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions 
Both Principal and Agent are self-interested 
 Fixed Wage Bonus Share ΠP ΠA UP UA 
Revenue Sharing Contract 0 - 0.27 5190 ECU 3390 ECU 5190 3390 
Bonus Contract 0 0 - 3000 ECU 3000 ECU 3000 3000 
Trust Contract 0 - - 3000 ECU 3000 ECU 3000 3000 
Principal is self-interested and Agent is inequity averse 
 Fixed Wage Bonus Share ΠP ΠA UP UA 
Revenue sharing Contract 0 - 0.52 4440 ECU 4140 ECU 4440 3840 
Bonus Contract 1701 ECU 0 - 4299 ECU 4281 ECU 4299a 4263 
Trust Contract 1701 ECU - - 4299 ECU 4281 ECU 4299a 4263 
Notes: This table summarizes the theoretical predictions for each of the three contracts under the assumption of 
narrow self-interest and inequity averse preferences, using a utility function as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). For 
RSC under narrow self-interest this results in a 60:40 split in favor of the principal, i.e. 
[5190/(5190+3390)]/[3390/(5190+3390)]. aIf, in addition to the agent, also the principal had inequity averse 
preferences, these utility values would change to 4293 (for both the BC and the TC), yet the optimal contracts 
remain unchanged. 
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Under rational self-interest we should observe a 60:40 split of the profits in favor of the 
principal. However, it is possible that distributional fairness may come into play and if so we 
might find a more equal distribution than the profit maximizing prediction. 
Hypothesis 5: In revenue sharing contracts, under the assumption of rational self-interested 
agents, the overall profits are distributed in a ratio of 60:40 between principals and agents to 
the disadvantage of the latter. 
Experimental Sequence  
Subjects read the instructions and filled a short questionnaire for the purpose of checking their 
understanding; explanations of any incorrect answer were provided by the software. Then three 
practice games, identical to the TC-ex, BC-ex, and RSC-ex games, were played to help the 
subjects familiarize with the experiment. The participants could ask questions at the end of each 
practice round. 
The ten payoff-relevant rounds were then played, consisting of one round of TC-ex, BC-ex, 
RSC-ex, and TBR each, plus a TBR-r game of six rounds. The order of games was 
counterbalanced as indicated in Figure 1. At the end of the experiment each participant was 
paid anonymously. All participants were informed at the start of the experiment that a random 
lottery payment mechanism would be used to determine payments, i.e. one of the ten payoff-
relevant rounds was randomly chosen and the participants were paid according to their 
performance in the randomly selected round.11 The Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) 
earned in the randomly selected round were converted into pounds at the rate of £0.004 per 
ECU. 144 students from the University of East Anglia were recruited for the experiment via 
                                                 
11 The random lottery system is a standard mechanism employed in the experimental methodology to control for 
wealth effects while not distorting the marginal incentives in each task; for a methodological discussion see Cubitt 
et al. (1998).  
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ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes and 
participants earned on average £15.46.  
III. Results 
A total of 144 subjects participated in the experiment which was conducted at the CBESS 
laboratory at the University of East Anglia. In what follows we consider the contract choice by 
the principal (sub-section 0), the corresponding effort by the agents (sub-section 0), whether 
the principals honored their bonus promises when a bonus contract was selected (sub-section 
0), and what the data tell us about efficiency and fairness (sub-section 0).12  
Contract choice 
This sub-section considers the choice of contract by the principals. 
Result 1: When given the option to choose between the three contracts, both in the one-shot 
(TBR) and the repeated games (TBR-r) three choices out of four were in favour of the revenue 
sharing contract RSC. The bonus contract (BC) was preferred to the trust contract (TC). 
Figure 2: Percentage of chosen contracts over time in repeated contract choice settings 
(TBR-r) 
 
                                                 
12 For a fine-grained summary of descriptive statistics, see Table C1 in the online appendix. 
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Notes: TC, BC and RSC indicate the trust, the bonus and the revenue sharing contract, respectively. The lines 
labelled TBR first only contain observations from subjects that first were confronted with the games TBR and TBR-
r before playing games with exogenously imposed contracts (TC-ex, BC-ex and RSC-ex). Conversely, exogenous 
first indicates that subjects first faced exogenously imposed contracts before giving the principals the choice over 
contract types (see Figure 1 for a description of both orders). If participants were exposed to the exogenous contract 
settings before making decisions in TBR and TBR-r games they were significantly more likely to choose RSC and 
less likely to choose the BC once they were offered the choice to do so (Wilcoxon tests: p=0.020, p=0.001 and 
p<0.001 for TC, BC and RSC, respectively). ). However, in terms of revealed effort levels, we find no order effect 
for all three contract types (Wilcoxon tests: p=0.069, p=0.763 and p=0.362 for TC, BC and RSC choices in all 
TBR-r rounds, respectively). 
Table 2: Percentages of chosen contracts 
  TBR TBR-r 
TC 4.17% 4.40% 
BC 20.83% 20.83% 
RSC  75.00% 74.77% 
Notes: All differences between contract types are highly significant in Wilcoxon tests (all p<0.01 for both TBR 
and TBR-r). Specifically, TC vs RSC: p<0.001 for TBR and TBR-r, BC vs RSC: p<0.001 for TBR and TBR-r; TC 
vs BC: p=0.007 for TBR and p<0.001 for TBR-r. 
 
Table 2 presents the percentage of chosen contracts in the TBR and TBR-r treatments, and 
Figure 2 shows how the proportions evolve over time in the TBR-r. More generally, in line with 
hypothesis 1, the revenue sharing contract was the most preferred contract by principals being 
selected 75% of the times, against 21% and 4% of choices for the bonus contract and the trust 
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contract, respectively. These differences are all significant in Wilcoxon tests.13 Table 2 also 
shows that the distribution of choices is virtually indistinguishable between TBR and TBR-r. 
As participants in the TBR-r games repeatedly made choices about contracts and contract 
parameters (principals), accepting or rejecting contracts and setting effort levels (agents), we 
also analyzed behavioral changes over time. As shown in Figure 2, there is an upward trend in 
choice of the RSC in the TBR-r, from in aggregate 71% in the first round to 86% in the last 
one. A multilevel Probit regression with subjects nested in sessions on the likelihood of 
choosing the RSC confirms the statistically significant positive time trend (p<0.001). 
Furthermore, if participants were exposed to the exogenous contract settings before making 
decisions in TBR and TBR-r games (in session 1-6), they were significantly more likely to 
choose RSC and less likely to choose the BC once they were offered the choice to do so. It 
seems that principals learned about the advantages of the RSC in the exogenous contract 
settings and were happy to choose it on average over 81% of the time as opposed to 66% of the 
time when they were not forced to use all contracts once before selecting their contract of choice 
(see Figure 2). However, in terms of revealed effort levels, we find no significant evidence for 
an order effect for all three contract types. This is confirmed by regression analysis (see Table 
4). Figure 3 indicates which contract parameters principals chose for each of the available 
contracts. In contracts with more than one parameter (i.e. BC, RSC), the contract parameters 
were negatively correlated which suggests that they were used as complements, i.e. principals 
traded-off the offered fixed wage against the announced bonus and the revenue share in BC and 
RSC, respectively. 
                                                 
13 In this paper, all non-parametric test statistics were calculated on session level means per game (TC-ex, BC-ex, 
RSC-ex, TBR, or TBR-r), unless stated otherwise. All p-values in the paper are two-tailed unless otherwise 
specified. 
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Table 3: Proportion of switches between contracts that resulted in improved outcomes 
    Higher individual profits Higher total revenue of  
    Principal Agent principal-agent pair 
TC     → 
BC 50.0% 50.0% 75.0% 
RSC 77.8% 55.6% 88.9% 
BC     → 
TC 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
RSC 72.7% 69.7% 63.6% 
RSC  → 
TC 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
BC 34.6% 50.0% 26.9% 
Notes: This table is based on data from rounds 2-6 of TBR-r games. Only contract switches were considered, i.e. 
if principals chose a different contract in round t-1 then in round t. The differences in the principals’ profits are 
highly significant for both switching from TC to RSC and from BC to RSC (Wilcoxon tests: p=0.013 and p=0.005, 
respectively). Although switching to the RSC from either TC or BC also made at least 55.6% of agents better off, 
the average increase in agents’ profits is not significant (p=0.450 and p=0.672 for TC->RSC and BC->RSC, 
respectively). 
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Figure 3: Visualization of contract parameters chosen by the principal 
 
 
 
Notes: The top panel presents a histogram of fixed wage offers for all TCs. The middle panel depicts a scatterplot 
of the announced bonuses (circles) and actual bonuses (triangles) against the corresponding fixed wages for all 
BCs. The announced bonuses are strongly negatively correlated with the fixed wage offers (Spearman: ρ=-0.393, 
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p<0.001). However, there is a much weaker and even positive correlation between the actually paid bonuses and 
the offered fixed wages (Spearman: ρ=0.105, p=0.049). The bottom panel shows a scatterplot of the offered shares 
against the fixed wage in all RSCs. The negative correlation between share and fixed wage (Spearman: ρ=-0.431) 
is highly significant (p<0.001). The grey areas in the middle and the bottom panel represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Table 3 shows that a large majority of the principals earned less by switching from the RSC to 
either TC or BC, and while half of the agents earned more from the principal switch from RSC 
to BC, none did so from the switch to RSC to TC. Online appendix D provides details on the 
contract parameters chosen by principals (separated by game), and online appendix E on the 
evolution of contract choices over time. 
Effort levels 
This sub-section considers the choice of effort by agents.  
Result 2: Effort levels were on average 60% higher in revenue sharing contracts relative to 
bonus contracts. Effort levels were 50% higher when a bonus contract was used than a trust 
contract. 
Figure 4: Average effort by contract type over time in repeated contract choice settings 
(TBR-r) 
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Notes: TC, BC and RSC indicate the trust, the bonus and the revenue sharing contract, respectively. The lines 
labelled TBR first only contain observations from subjects that first were confronted with the games TBR and TBR-
r before playing games with exogenously imposed contracts (TC-ex, BC-ex and RSC-ex). Conversely, exogenous 
first indicates that subjects first faced exogenously imposed contracts before giving the principals the choice over 
contract types (see Figure 1 for a description of both orders). Note that in the condition TC-exogenous first not a 
single principal chose TC in round 5 or 6 (hence these observations are missing from the figure). 
Table 4: Determinants of Agents’ Effort for Accepted Contracts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  all all RSC only BC only 
BC 3.951*** 8.711***     
  (0.889) (1.761)     
RSC 9.015*** 13.38***     
  (1.034) (1.417)     
Suggested effort 0.489*** 0.0454 0.397 0.245 
  (0.0884) (0.0931) (0.218) (0.143) 
Fixed wage -0.0000241 0.00481*** -0.000246 0.00347* 
  (0.000838) (0.00129) (0.00118) (0.00145) 
Exogenous contract -1.449 0.895 -1.223 -2.801 
  (1.007) (2.043) (1.099) (1.795) 
Game TBR -0.812 -1.889 -1.007 -3.367 
  (0.865) (2.093) (0.818) (2.899) 
Overall round -0.0388 -0.0469 -0.0872 -0.107 
  (0.115) (0.113) (0.117) (0.226) 
Round within game TBR-r -0.0455 -0.0441 -0.0767 -0.245 
  (0.156) (0.154) (0.159) (0.408) 
BC x fixed wage   -0.00328     
    (0.00213)     
BC x suggested effort   0.468**     
    (0.154)     
RSC x fixed wage   -0.00743***     
    (0.00161)     
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RSC x suggested effort   0.762***     
    (0.221)     
Exogenous contract x BC   -3.466     
    (2.221)     
Exogenous contract x RSC   -1.884     
    (2.097)     
Game TBR x BC   -0.736     
    (3.175)     
Game TBR x RSC   1.413     
    (1.961)     
Share     7.931***   
      (2.281)   
Incentive compatible share     3.000*   
      (1.150)   
Announced bonus       0.00503*** 
        (0.000960) 
Constant 8.205*** 3.270* 15.71*** 8.421*** 
  (0.896) (1.555) (0.768) (1.481) 
Observations 656 656 418 155 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.402 0.237 0.176 
Notes: The baseline condition for the estimations in columns 1 and 2 was TC in the game TBR-r. Columns 3 and 
4 were estimated using only RSC and BC observations, respectively. The table contains coefficients of linear 
regressions with standard errors clustered at subject level in parentheses. All variables that were interacted with 
BC or RSC (i.e. fixed wage, announced bonus, suggested effort, share, incentive compatible share, exogenous 
contract and exogenous games first) were subtracted off their means before estimating the models. Tables C5 and 
C6 in the online appendix contain the results of multilevel models (to additionally control for session level non-
independence) and Tobit regressions (to control for data censoring at 0 and 20), respectively. These results are very 
close to those presented here (both qualitatively and quantitatively). BC and RSC are dummies for the bonus and 
the revenue sharing contract, respectively. TBR and TBR-r indicate one-shot and repeated games with endogenous 
contract choice by the principal. The dummy incentive compatible share is one if the principal offered a share ≥ 
0.27, the lowest share that satisfied the incentive compatibility constraint, and zero otherwise. Exogenous contract 
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is a dummy for TC-ex, BC-ex and RSC-ex games and the dummy exogenous games first controls for order effects; 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% level.  
 
The average effort level across all games under revenue sharing, bonus and trust contracts are 
16.18, 10.06 and 4.9 respectively. Figure 4 illustrates the average effort over time and Table 4 
presents regressions with agents’ effort as the dependent variable. In line with hypothesis 2, the 
effort levels chosen by the agents in revenue sharing contracts were significantly higher than in 
bonus or trust contracts. This is true for the overall sample and for each of the games separately 
(Wilcoxon p<0.05). The regression coefficient on the RSC dummy is significant, implying, 
other things being equal, an increase in effort in revenue sharing contracts by at least around 9 
points relative to the trust contract. The coefficient of the RSC dummy is also statistically 
significantly higher than the coefficient of the BC dummy, i.e. the regression analysis confirms 
that the RSC results in more effort than the BC (F-test, p<0.001) which itself results in more 
effort than TC. Effort levels were significantly higher with bonus contracts than with trust 
contracts. This is true for the overall sample, for the exogenously set games and for TBR-r 
(p<0.05 for each of the tests). In TBR the difference between bonus and trust contracts was not 
statistically significant due to the very small number of observations14 of TC (p=0.26). The 
results in Table 4 imply that suggested effort positively affected actual effort.15 Other contract 
details mattered as well: in the BC, effort increased in the size of the announced bonus and, in 
the RSC, it increased with the revenue share offered to the agent, particularly if incentive 
compatible, i.e. the offered share was greater than or equal to 0.27. Overall, increasing the fixed 
wage significantly increased effort. However, this result is driven by trust and bonus contracts. 
Analyzing revenue sharing and bonus contracts separately (see column 3 and 4 in Table 4) 
                                                 
14 The number of times a TC, a BC or an RSC was selected in the TBR were 3, 15 and 54 respectively.   
15 Unlike actual effort, suggested effort did not change across treatments, and tended to be close to the maximum 
of 20 (see Table C1 in the online appendix). 
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indicates that a higher fixed wage only slightly increased effort in BC whereas it did not have 
any effect on effort under revenue sharing contracts. 
Figure 5: Conditioning of actual bonus payments on revealed effort 
 
Notes: The figure shows mean actual bonus payments depending on whether the revealed effort was higher than, 
the same as or lower than the suggested effort. Agents were punished with significantly lower bonus payments 
when they exerted less effort than suggested (Wilcoxon p<0.001). Error bars denote standard errors. 
 
Honoring bonus payments 
Result 3: In the bonus contract, the majority of principals pay bonuses, but less than they 
announced to pay. 
In line with hypothesis 3, over 81% of all bonus contracts, principals did not honor their initial 
bonus announcements.16 Figure 5 shows how the actual bonus payments were conditioned on 
revealed effort; while there was always a gap between actual and announced bonus payments, 
mean actual bonus payments were lowest when agents produced less than the suggested effort. 
In a further regression analysis (in the online appendix), we show that, in line with previous 
                                                 
16 They matched it only around 16% of the cases, and provided a higher bonus in less than 3% of the cases. 
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literature (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 2004; Fehr et. al. 2007), in the bonus 
contract, the actually paid bonus was a positive function of revealed effort. Specifically, we 
find that each extra unit of effort led to around 34 ECU in extra bonus.17  
Efficiency and fairness in revenue sharing contracts 
This sub-section considers the extent to which revenue sharing contracts met considerations of 
efficiency and fairness. 
In line with hypothesis 2, the revenue sharing contract was the most efficient contract. Average 
total revenue was 2238 ECU in RSC-ex versus 1302 ECU in BC-ex and 738 ECU in TC-ex 
(Wilcoxon tests, p<0.01 in all cases). In the TBR, mean total revenue was 2389, 1420 and 200 
ECU when the revenue sharing contract, the bonus contract and trust contract, were chosen 
respectively. In the TBR-r, the corresponding numbers are 2476, 1690 and 200 ECU for the 
revenue sharing contract, the bonus contract and trust contract respectively. Both in TBR as 
well as in TBR-r the average total revenue is highest for revenue sharing contracts (one-sided 
Wilcoxon tests; TBR: RSC vs BC: p=0.025, RSC vs TC: p=0.006; TBR-r: RSC vs BC: p<0.001, 
RSC vs TC: p<0.001). The average total revenue was not significantly different between TBR 
and TBR-r rounds (for all contract types, p>0.4).18 As shown by Table 3, in a majority of cases, 
ranging from 64% to 89% depending on the combination, the total revenue of principal-agent 
pairs went up if the principal switched from BC or TC to RSC, and went down in the opposite 
case.   
Result 4: Over 70% of offered revenue sharing contracts were incentive compatible. However, 
offers tend to be higher than the lowest incentive compatible share of 0.27. 
                                                 
17 The online appendix (Table C3) includes a linear regression (multilevel, mixed effects) model, estimated with 
random intercepts on subjects nested in sessions, in which no other variable is statistically significant.  
18 For descriptive statistics on revenues including standard errors, please see Table C4 in the online appendix. 
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Figure 6: Histograms of revenue shares offered by principals 
 
Notes: This figure includes observations of all revenue sharing contracts, irrespective the actual setting (RSC-ex, 
TBR and TBR-r). The vertical lines depict the lowest incentive compatible share under self-interest (long dash, at 
0.27) and the share that results in an exact 50:50 split (dash dotted, at 0.57). 
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of revenue shares offered and whether they were accepted or 
rejected by the agents. In line with hypothesis 4, the majority of offered revenue sharing 
contracts (70%) were incentive compatible.19 Not a single principal chose a revenue share of 
exactly 0.27, the share predicted as the profit maximizing one under narrow self-interest.20 The 
mean offered share was 0.382 (median: 0.4), and was not significantly different across RSC-
ex, TBR, and TBR-r games (all Wilcoxon tests between games reveal p>0.4). The actually 
offered shares were significantly higher than the lowest incentive compatible share of 0.27 both 
for the full sample and for each game separately (sign tests, all p<0.05).  However, the offered 
shares were significantly lower than the inequity averse prediction of a 0.52, if 100% of agents 
are assumed inequity averse (sign tests, all p<0.001.). 
                                                 
19 Specifically, 74%, 83% and 78% of contracts offered were above 0.27 in RSC-ex, TBR and TBR-r respectively. 
20 This is true for all RSC occurrences irrespective the game type (RSC-ex, TBR, and TBR-r). However, over 60% 
of the revenue sharing contracts offered “round shares”, i.e. shares that had either 0 or 5 at the second decimal 
place.  
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Overall, about 7% of the revenue sharing contracts were rejected. When the offered share was 
greater than or equal to 0.27 only 6% of the contracts were rejected whereas 11% of offers with 
shares of less than 0.27 were rejected. With a fixed wage of 0, a share of 0.57 would result in 
an exact 50:50 split between principal and agent.  For this reason we divided the offered shares 
in three categories: the incentive incompatible offers with S < 0.27; the offers which would lead 
to the agent earning more than an equal split S > 0.57; and the offers which lied in between 0.27 
≤ S < 0.57. Comparing the three areas of offered shares, i.e. S < 0.27, 0.27 ≤ S < 0.57, and S ≥ 
0.57, we found no statistical difference regarding the rate of rejections between the contract 
offers with S < 0.27 and 0.27 ≤ S < 0.57 (Wilcoxon, p=1). However, the rejection rates of 
contracts that offered S ≥ 0.57 were significantly lower than for offers either of S < 0.27 or of 
0.27 ≤ S < 0.57 (Wilcoxon, p=0.025 and p<0.001, respectively). The average rejection rates 
were 6% and 0% for 0.27 ≤ S < 0.57 and S ≥ 0.57, respectively. In fact, the rejection rate for S 
≥ 0.52, i.e. the predicted share for a population of 100% Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity 
averse agents, was 0% as well. The difference between rejection rates below and above 0.52 is 
significant (Wilcoxon: p=0.002).  
The observed mean of offered shares of 0.382 could be explained by a number of factors. First, 
there is no large increase in rejection rate for offers above 0.27 and up to 0.52, and so there is 
reason to believe that principals may be offering a little over 0.27 not to reduce the likelihood 
of being rejected but rather out of fairness. This conjecture is consistent with the findings of 
Anderhub et al. (2002), which suggest concerns for fairness to be the influential factor behind 
offers higher than the incentive compatibility constraint. Second, the observed mean of 0.382 
could be explained by the principals assuming that there is a distribution of the inequity averse 
parameter in the population of agents who differ in the extent to which they are inequity 
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averse.21 Third, it is possible that offering larger shares increases the salience of the opportunity 
to benefit from contributing high effort levels.  
Result 5: Revenue sharing contracts resulted in a fairer distribution of profits than the profit 
maximizing prediction and this distribution is close to the prediction for inequity averse agents. 
Nevertheless, welfare gains were mostly absorbed by the principals. 
Because of most revenue sharing contracts having a revenue share for the agent of more than 
0.27, as shown in Result 4, we would expect to observe a split that is more equal than 60-40% 
for the principal. Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case, with 53% going to the principal in 
the exogenous revenue sharing contract (RSC-ex), 53% in the one-shot game selected revenue 
sharing contracts (TBR) and 54% in the repeated game selected revenue sharing contracts 
(TBR-r), percentages all significantly lower than 60% (Wilcoxon p<0.001). We find no 
significant difference between RSC-ex, TBR, and TBR-r rounds (Wilcoxon, p>0.2). Comparing 
our profit distribution to our theoretical predictions for inequity averse agents or with empirical 
findings from other games suggests that a 53:47 or 54:46 split is quite close to the inequity 
averse prediction of 52:48 (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Güth et al. 1982). 
Table 5: Predicted and observed distribution of profits resulting from revenue sharing 
contracts 
Prediction  Observation 
    Profit Share    Profit Share 
Self 
Interest 
Principal 5190 60%  Results 
RSC-ex 
Principal 4206 53% 
Agent 3390 40%  Agent 3741 47% 
                                                 
21 The goodness of fit of Charness and Rabin’s (2002) model is considered in the online appendix, and is inferior 
to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) for the specific setup of this paper. It is less likely that the principals assumed a 
certain share of agents to be perfectly self-interested and the rest of agents to be totally inequity averse as this 
would have resulted in a binomial distribution of offered shares around 0.27 and 0.53 (depending on whether a 
principal believed that she was making an offer to a perfectly self-interested or entirely inequity averse agent). 
However, our data does not support this interpretation (see Figure 6). 
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Difference  20%  Difference  6% 
Inequity 
averse 
agent 
Principal 4440 52%  
Results 
TBR 
Principal 4269 53% 
Agent 4140 48%  Agent 3806 47% 
Difference  4%  Difference  6% 
     
Results 
TBR-r 
Principal 4359 54% 
     Agent 3786 46% 
     Difference  7% 
Notes: RSC-ex denotes an exogenously determined one-shot revenue sharing contract. TBR and TBR-r represent 
contract choice situations in a one-shot and repeated game, respectively. Only accepted contracts are considered 
for the profits in the right part of the table (Observation). 
 
Table 6 shows that the overall profits were higher in revenue sharing contracts than in trust 
contracts and bonus contracts. It also shows that the principals largely absorbed the surplus, 
earning 18% and 44% more in revenue sharing contracts than in bonus and trust contracts, 
respectively. This higher efficiency applies across all games, and therefore explains why, when 
a choice was given, principals tended to choose revenue sharing contracts.  
Table 6: Average and standard deviation of profits across contracts 
    Trust Contract Bonus Contract Revenue Sharing 
C t t     Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD 
Exogenously 
determined 
Principal 3058 (46%) 720 3657 (51%) 981 4206 (53%) 757 
Agent 3618 (54%) 500 3505 (49%) 533 3741 (47%) 467 
Total 6675 (100%) 887 7162 (100%) 1086 7947 (100%) 862 
TBR  
Principal 2700 (44%) 173 3582 (48%) 1205 4269 (53%) 577 
Agent 3496 (56%) 3 3663 (52%) 542 3806 (47%) 410 
Total 6196 (100%) 170 7245 (100%) 1190 8075 (100%) 730 
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TBR-r 
Principal 2875 (42%) 1076 3733 (49%) 988 4359 (54%) 651 
Agent 3849 (58%) 668 3755 (51%) 660 3786 (46%) 428 
Total 6725 (100%) 995 7489 (100%) 1136 8145 (100%) 768 
Notes: TBR and TBR-r represent contract choice situations in a one-shot and repeated game, respectively. The 
overall profits were significantly higher in revenue sharing contracts than in trust contracts (Wilcoxon p<0.001, 
p=0.011, p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r, respectively) and bonus contracts (Wilcoxon 
p<0.001, p=0.05, p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r, respectively). Principals earn 
significantly more with revenue sharing contracts (with respect to trust contracts: Wilcoxon p<0.001, p=0.011, 
p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r respectively. With respect to bonus contracts: 
Wilcoxon p=0.004, p=0.028, p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r respectively). The 
agents’ profits are larger in RSC than in other contracts when it is exogenously imposed (BC<->RSC: p=0.005 and 
TC<->RSC: p=0.078), but this is not the case for TBR (BC<->RSC: p=0.508 TC<->RSC: p=0.036) and TBR-r 
(BC<->RSC: p=0.551, TC<->RSC: p=0.432). In RSC agents are almost no worse off with respect to trust contracts: 
Wilcoxon p=0.078, p=0.036, p=0.432 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r respectively; with respect 
to bonus contracts: Wilcoxon p=0.005, p=0.508, p=0.551 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r 
respectively). 
 
The agent’s average profit was larger when a RSC was implemented when compared to a BC 
(Wilcoxon, p=0.039) and at least the same under TC (Wilcoxon, p=0.089). These differences 
are maintained under the exogenous contracts, but the results are not significant for TBR and 
TBR-r. In any case, these results suggest that the agents were at least not worse off in terms of 
earnings when an RSC was implemented. The share of the surpluses between principals and 
agents was almost the same under all three contract types, being very close to the inequity 
averse prediction. In relative terms agents were almost no worse off in revenue sharing contracts 
than they were in the other contracts (3% relative to trust contracts and 4% relative to bonus 
contracts). In the TBR-r, switches from BC to RSC and from TC to RSC both resulted in higher 
profits for agents (in 56% and 70% of the cases, respectively: see Table 3). 
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IV. Discussion  
This paper explored how monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation can complement each 
other in principal-agent settings. We asked principals to choose between using a bonus contract 
as in Fehr et al. (2007), a revenue sharing contract as in Anderhub et al. (2002) and a trust 
contract as a third option. In contrast to Fehr et al. (2007), who found that only 10% of the 
principals chose the enforceable monetarily incentivized contract, in our experiment on average 
over 75% of the principals chose such an option. Moreover, we find that revenue sharing was 
also more efficient than the bonus and trust contracts by leading the agents to exert 60% more 
effort in the RSC as in the BC. Consequently more revenue was generated and on average both 
principals and agents earned more when a revenue sharing contract was used. However, the 
majority of the additional output was absorbed by the principal. That being said, the 
distributions of profits were fairer than the theoretical predictions under self-interest and close 
to the inequity averse prediction. Lastly, in line with Fehr et al. (2007), though on average 
principals reciprocated to positive effort levels with positive bonuses, some principals did not 
pay a bonus at all and the majority of principals (81%) paid a bonus smaller than what they 
initially announced. 
It is not surprising that principals tend to prefer the bonus contracts over the trust contracts. 
Bonus contracts reduce the relative risks for the principal compared to the trust contract by 
allowing to pay a portion of the wage upfront and a portion after effort has been observed. 
Where the trust contract only requires a trusting principal, the bonus contract requires both 
players to show trust to each other. The revenue sharing contract eliminates all risks of free 
riding for both principal and agent and this is achieved without providing negative connotations 
of distrust, as with a monitoring contract. We believe that these two motives may to a great 
extend explain the differences we observe between our study and that of Fehr et al. (2007), in 
which the bonus contract was the most preferred option. That said, we note that the revenue 
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sharing contract differs from the bonus contract both in terms of the shape of the incentive 
mechanism and in terms of risk reduction, and so more research is clearly needed to separate 
out these alternative driving forces.  
Our results are in line with the findings of Fehr et al. (2008) on the optimal allocation of property 
rights. In their study, two parties negotiate over the allocation of ownership rights before 
investing in a project. In one treatment the two parties start with joint ownership and one of the 
two players (the principal) can decide to either sell her share or retain it. In another treatment, 
the principal is the sole owner and can either sell 50% of the firm (i.e. offer joint ownership) or 
offer a fixed wage to the second party. The majority of the principals (approximately 64%) 
preferred joint ownership and similarly the agents responded with high investment levels. Our 
experiment has a different design since it provides a straight choice among a revenue sharing 
contract, a fixed wage contract as well as a bonus contract. There is also no restriction on the 
revenue share that can be offered, making offer shares less attractive to inequity averse agents 
possible. By providing a wider choice set and allowing revenue sharing contracts that could be 
less attractive to inequity averse agents, our experiment therefore provides a more general test 
of the success of revenue sharing than those provided by Fehr et al.’s (2008) settings. An 
additional element of generality was that we tested, and found our results robust to, having a 
one shot relative to a repeated game setup. 
It is a feature of having equal initial endowments that the difference between the payoff 
outcomes under equality and that under 100% self-interested agents is one between a 50:50 and 
60:40 ratio in the revenue sharing contract, even though the underlying behavior is one where 
the revenue share chosen by the principal ranges from 0.27 to 0.57. In future research, one could 
increase the gap between self-interested and inequity averse predictions by suitable endowment 
changes as a robustness test of our results. 
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V. Conclusions 
We have presented a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to 
choose between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Revenue 
sharing contracts emerge as the preferred contract by a large number of principals when they 
are given this choice. They provide a ‘carrot’ to agents by encouraging them to work more by 
getting a share of the profits, and this works in a way that the monitoring contract used by Fehr 
et al. (2007) does not when offered as an alternative to bonus contracts. In other words, in 
incentive-compatible type of contracts, carrots appear to work better than sticks. 
A key finding of our experiment is that revenue sharing contracts have the advantage of being 
the most efficient form of contracts while at the same time being fair. The distribution of 
earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. Indeed, in the repeated games, switches 
to revenue sharing contracts led to Pareto improvements for a majority of both principals and 
agents. We conclude that under revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand 
with efficiency and the use of monetary incentives. 
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A. Experimental Parameters and Predictions 
Three different contracts types are used in this experiment, the trust contract (TC), the bonus 
contract (BC) and the revenue sharing contract (RSC).  
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The agent’s profit in the case of a revenue sharing contract is defined as: 
𝛑𝛑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑
𝐀𝐀 = 𝐅𝐅 + 𝐑𝐑 ∗ 𝐑𝐑(𝐞𝐞).     (A1) 
The agent’s profit in the case of a trust contract is defined as: 
𝛑𝛑𝐓𝐓𝐑𝐑
𝐀𝐀 = 𝐅𝐅.       (A2)
 
The agent’s profit in the case of a bonus contract is defined as: 
πTC
A = F + B.       (A3) 
The Total Revenue is given by: 
𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) = 150 ∗ 𝑒𝑒.      (A4) 
The cost of effort is a strictly increasing and convex function in effort: 
𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) = 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒2.      (A5) 
With: 
𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇,𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴  ... Agent’s profit in the case of TC, BC and RSC, respectively 
𝐹𝐹 ... Unconditional fixed wage 
𝐹𝐹 ∈  {0,1, … ,2999,3000} 
𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) ... Revenue 
𝑆𝑆 ... Relative share of the Revenue that is transferred to the agent in the revenue 
sharing contract 
𝑆𝑆 ∈  {0.00, 0.01, … ,0.99,1.00} 
𝐵𝐵 ... Optional bonus paid to the agent in a bonus contract 
𝐵𝐵 ∈  {0,1, … ,2999,3000} 
𝑒𝑒 ... Effort level revealed by the agent 
𝑒𝑒 ∈  {0,1, … ,19,20} 
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a. The game theoretic solution 
Given the above parameters, the participation constraint, i.e. the constraint that has to be met 
in order to make any contract offer monetarily beneficial, is: 
𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) ≥ 0.      (A6) 
where 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) is the transfer the principal needs to provide to the agent as compensation for 
exerting effort. The nature of that transfer depends on the type of contract that will be chosen 
from the principal. Thus agents should only accept a contract if (A6) is met. 
The Principal’s profit is defined as 
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) − 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒).      (A7) 
where 𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) is the total revenue generated and 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) is the transfer to the agent. Maximizing by 
𝑒𝑒 results in 𝑒𝑒 = 74.5. The experimental parameters only allow 𝑒𝑒 ∈  {0,1, … ,19,20}, and so the 
maximization problem in (A7) has a corner solution of 𝑒𝑒∗ = 20.1 
Having identified the participation constraint and the profit maximizing effort level, the 
following step is to show why, given the assumption that both the principal and the agent are 
rational and narrowly self-interested, the only contract that can satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint is the RSC.  
Any contract is deemed to only be incentive compatible if: 
∀e: T(e∗) − C(e∗) ≥ T(e) − C(e).    (A8) 
                                                 
1 The decision to have a corner solution has been made deliberately under the suspicion that will be easier for 
subjects in the role of principals to identify e* if that is a corner than an interior point. In other words, the choice 
for a corner solution was made to reduce complexity to an already highly complex design from the perspective of 
the principal. 
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Inequality (A8) implies that the agent’s profit from exerting effort level 𝑒𝑒∗ (which is 
maximizing the principal’s profit) should be greater or equal to the profit that results from 
exerting all possible effort levels 𝑒𝑒.  
The following three sections examine incentive compatibility for the revenue sharing, trust and 
bonus contracts respectively, by substituting 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) by the specific transfer definitions of each of 
the three contracts. 
 
The revenue sharing contract: 
Replacing 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) with the revenue sharing contract specific transfer of 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝑆𝑆 ∗ 150𝑒𝑒 results 
in: 
∀e: F + S ∗ 150e∗ − e∗ − e∗2 ≥ F + S ∗ 150e − e − e2.     (A9) 
Given that the agent would exert an effort greater than zero if 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒∗) ≥ 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒) is satisfied, the 
agent would, as a worst case accept, 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒∗) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒). Consequently, in order to calculate the 
minimum share of the total revenue that has to be provided to the agent in order to make the 
revenue sharing contract incentive compatible, the profit maximization problem for the agent 
could be written as 
πRSC
A = F + S ∗ 150e∗ − e∗ − e∗2.     (A10) 
Maximizing (A10) with respect to 𝑒𝑒∗ leads to  
S ∗ 150e∗ − 1 − 2e∗ = 0 and 
S =  2e∗ + 1150  
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Inserting the above calculated effort level 𝑒𝑒∗ = 20 and solving for 𝑆𝑆, finally provides the 
minimum share 𝑆𝑆. Thus, 
S = 0.273̇.      (A11) 
Thus, the revenue sharing contract is incentive compatible for any value of 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0.273̇. 
With 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆∗ the consequent profits for the principal and the agent are respectively: 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 = 5,181 
ECU2 and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 3,399 ECU. Considering that principals could only specify 𝑆𝑆 using two decimal 
places, i.e. set 𝑆𝑆 = 0.27 rather than 𝑆𝑆 = 0.273̇, the predicted profits become 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 = 5,190 ECU 
and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 3,390 ECU. 
 
The trust contract: 
Replacing 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) with the trust contract specific transfer of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐹𝐹 results in the incentive 
compatibility constraint for all trust contracts: 
∀e: F − C(e∗) ≥ F − C(e).    (A12) 
which can be restated as: 
C(e∗) ≤ C(e).     (A13) 
Because of (A5) the only value of 𝑒𝑒∗ that satisfies equation (A13) is 𝑒𝑒∗ = 0. Therefore, there 
exists no feasible incentive compatible trust contract for 𝑒𝑒∗ > 0. 
 
  
                                                 
2 ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. 
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The bonus contract: 
Replacing 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) with the bonus contract specific transfer of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝐵𝐵 results in the incentive 
compatibility constraint for all bonus contracts: 
∀e: F + B − C(e∗) ≥ F + B − C(e).    (A14) 
Rewriting leads to: 
C(e∗) ≤ C(e).      (A15) 
This is identical to the result obtained for the trust contract. Therefore, it has been shown that 
economic theory predicts that under the assumption of selfish rational profit maximizing 
individuals no agreement can be reached between a principal and an agent in neither the trust 
nor the bonus contracts. From the results obtained above, it is clear that the only contract that 
can satisfy both the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints is the revenue 
sharing contract RSC. Consequently, the game theoretic solution that is expected in the TBR 
and TBR-r game(s) is that RSC should dominate both BC and TC. 
 
b. Extension for social preferences (i) 
In the following we assume the agent to have Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences of 
inequality aversion (see equation (A16)). We begin by analysing how the contracts’ parameters 
must be set by the principal in order to be acceptable by an inequity averse agent and continue 
discussing the effect of an inequality averse principal for each contract individually.3 
                                                 
3 Although mentioned in the context of each contract separately, due to the sequential nature of the game (1. 
principal offers contract, 2. agent exerts effort), the following predictions are all driven by the agent’s preferences 
about inequality aversion. In general, the principal’s preferences do not matter. 
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Furthermore, we derive predictions for the contracts’ parameters in order to make an inequality 
averse agent exert the efficient effort level of 20. 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 − 𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴, 0) − 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 − 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 , 0).  (A16) 
Equation (A16) represents the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model for inequality averse individuals 
with 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 being the agent’s utility and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 and 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 denoting the monetary payoffs for agents and 
principals, respectively. The parameters 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 describe the degree to which the agent dislikes 
being worse off and better off than the principal, respectively. Note that due to the specific 
form of the agent’s cost function (𝐶𝐶 = 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒2), for all three contract types the agent’s marginal 
utility is strictly monotonically decreasing in effort, i.e. ∀𝛼𝛼 > 0: 𝑑𝑑2𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒2⁄ < 0. Therefore, a 
set of contract parameters that lets an agent prefer exerting effort 𝑒𝑒 over exerting effort 𝑒𝑒 − 1 
will also let the agent prefer effort 𝑒𝑒 over all positive effort levels less than 𝑒𝑒, i.e. 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒) >
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒′) ∀0 ≤ 𝑒𝑒′ < 𝑒𝑒. In our case we provide predictions for contract specifications for 𝑒𝑒 = 1 and 
𝑒𝑒 = 20 to establish the minimal parameters necessary to make an agent accept the contract and 
exert an effort of 20, respectively. 
 
Contract acceptance and the efficient effort level 
An agent will accept a contract and invest an effort level of at least one if 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒 = 1),𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒 = 1)) > 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒 = 0),𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒 = 0)).4    (A17) 
Considering that both principals and agents would receive their endowments of 3000 ECU if 
no contract was formed, an agent would accept a contract and exert an effort greater than zero 
                                                 
4 Note that it makes no difference in payoffs whether an agent rejects a contract or accepts it but exerts an effort 
level of zero, i.e. 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒 = 0) = 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒 = 0) = 3000. 
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only if 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃) > 3000. Similarly, to find the contract parameters that would result in 
exerting the efficient effort level of 𝑒𝑒 = 20, the following condition must be satisfied: 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒 = 20),𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒 = 20)) > 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒 = 19),𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒 = 19)).  (A18) 
Note that the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function is not differentiable at 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃. In the 
following analysis we therefore use numerical simulations to derive predictions. 
 
Trust contract 
Anticipating that the agent will set his effort level in order to maximize his (inequality averse) 
utility function, the principal decides on the size of the fixed wage 𝐹𝐹. Whether or not the 
principal should set 𝐹𝐹 = 0 (as in the payoff maximizing prediction) or to a different non-
negative value depends on the agent’s aversion to advantageous inequality 𝛽𝛽. In the case of 
𝐹𝐹 = 0, the agent will either shirk (𝑒𝑒 = 0) or not accept the contract at all and both the principal 
and the agent will earn their endowments of 3000 ECU. If 𝐹𝐹 > 0, it depends on the agent’s 
value of 𝛽𝛽 how much effort he will be willing to exert. Assuming reasonable values for the 
agent’s inequality aversion parameters (e.g. 𝛼𝛼 = 1, 𝛽𝛽 = 0.355) the principal would offer 𝐹𝐹 =1701 to make the agent respond with 𝑒𝑒 = 20. However, if the agent’s aversion to advantageous 
inequality 𝛽𝛽 is expected to be rather small (e.g. De Bruyn & Bolton, 2008,  empirically 
estimated 𝛽𝛽 = 0.003 from Ultimatum game data), the agent will shirk (𝑒𝑒 = 0) irrespective the 
amount of the offered fixed wage 𝐹𝐹. Under these assumptions, it would be rational to set 𝐹𝐹 =
                                                 
5 For example Blanco et al. (2011) estimate the parameter to be 𝛼𝛼 = 0.93, 𝛽𝛽 = 0.38 which is very close to Fehr 
& Schmidt (1999) whose parameter distributions used means of α = 0.85, β = 0.32. 
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0.6 As the agent determines both the principal’s and his own payoff by exerting an effort 𝑒𝑒, and 
no further action is required by the principal, it does not affect the predicted results whether 
the principal had selfish or inequality averse preferences. It is only the principal’s expectations 
about the agent’s preferences and the agent’s preferences itself that matter. 
 
Bonus contract 
As the inequality averse agent cannot be certain about the preferences of the principal, he or 
she would disregard any announced bonus payment as cheap talk and react to any offered fixed 
wage as he would to a trust contract offer. Assuming reasonable values for the agent’s 
inequality aversion parameters (i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = 1, 𝛽𝛽 = 0.35), the principal (independent of her 
preferences) should offer a fixed wage of 1701 and announce a bonus payment of zero which 
would result in an exerted effort level of 20. If however, the principal expects the agent’s 𝛽𝛽 to 
be rather low (see De Bruyn & Bolton, 2008), she should set 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐵𝐵 = 0, as in this case the  
agent is expected to shirk, no matter how generous the fixed wage offer was. 
 
Revenue sharing contract 
In the revenue sharing contract the principal offers to pay a fixed wage 𝐹𝐹 and a revenue share 
𝑆𝑆. In line with the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model we assume that only the distribution of final 
payments but not the channels through which any payments were distributed matter. In that 
sense any payments arising from either 𝐹𝐹 or 𝑆𝑆 are substitutes. As this is common knowledge, 
                                                 
6 Note that, provided agents have a low advantageous inequality parameter 𝛽𝛽, they would accept any contract with 
𝐹𝐹 > 0 but exert 𝑒𝑒 = 0. This is also true for Bonus and Revenue sharing contracts. 
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but the principal does not know the preferences of the agent, she sets 𝐹𝐹 = 0 and only uses 𝑆𝑆 to 
adjust the payment to the agent. Again, considering reasonable parameter values for the agent’s 
inequality aversion (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0.35), a principal must at least offer a share 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0.35 in 
order to ensure that the contract is accepted by the agent.7 As a payoff maximizing principal 
would not offer any higher share than necessary, she would best respond with her actually 
offered share to her expectation about the agent’s level of inequality aversion. Expecting 𝛼𝛼 =1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0.35, a principal should set 𝑆𝑆 = 0.52 in order to make the agent exert an effort of 
𝑒𝑒 = 20 which will lead him to maximise his profits. As, similarly to the trust contract, the agent 
determines the payoffs by exerting an effort 𝑒𝑒, and no further action is required by the principal, 
it does not affect the predicted result whether the principal had selfish or inequality averse 
preferences. It is only the principal’s expectations about the agent’s preferences and the agent’s 
preferences itself that matter. 
 
c. Extension for social preferences (ii) 
In the following we consider the Charness & Rabin (2002) model for social preferences that 
specifies a notion of reciprocity in addition to an aspect of ‘difference aversion’. The agent’s 
utility is defined as  
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = (ρ ∙ r + σ ∙ s + θ ∙ q) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + (1 − ρ ∙ r − σ ∙ s − θ ∙ q) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴.  (A19) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 denotes the utility of the agent and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴and 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 describe the monetary payoff for the 
agent and the principal, respectively. The parameters ρ and σ could be interpreted as the 
                                                 
7 Remember that 𝐹𝐹 = 0 and 𝑆𝑆 = 0.27 was sufficient to incentivize the efficient effort level of 20 in the case of 
payoff maximizing agents. 
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importance of the principal’s payoff relative to the agent’s payoff if agent’s payoff is higher or 
lower than the principal’s payoff, respectively. The parameter θ allows for reciprocating fair 
or unfair behavior by the principal. Further, if 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃, then 𝑟𝑟 = 1 and 𝑠𝑠 = 0. Otherwise, if 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃, then 𝑟𝑟 = 0 and 𝑠𝑠 = 1. In any case, 𝑞𝑞 = 1 if A has “misbehaved” (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002, p.822) and 𝑞𝑞 = 0 made a fair offer.8 Using many different experimental settings, 
Charness and Rabin (2002) estimated the parameters to take the following values: 𝜌𝜌 = 0.424, 
𝜎𝜎 = 0.023 and 𝜃𝜃 = −0.111.9 
Restating equation (A19) for the two cases described above results in 
Case 1a: the principal ‘behaved’, i.e. made a fair offer and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 0.424 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 0.424) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,    (A20) 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 0.424 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + 0.576 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴.    (A21) 
Case 1b: the principal ‘behaved’ and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 0.023 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 0.023) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 ,   (A22) 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 0.023 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + 0.977 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴.   (A23) 
Case 2a: the principal ‘misbehaved’, i.e. made an unfair offer and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = (0.424 − 0.111) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 0.424 + 0.111) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,  (A24) 
                                                 
8 Although Charness and Rabin (2002, p.822) define “𝑞𝑞 = −1” if the principal misbehaved, their results and, more 
importantly, their discussion of their results clearly indicates that they actually meant “𝑞𝑞 = 1”. Thus, we will use 
the “𝑞𝑞 = 1” definition to state the utility functions for cases 2a and 2b. 
9 We are not aware of any other paper that estimated coefficients for the Charness and Rabin model than Charness 
and Rabin (2002). 
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𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 0.313 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + 0.687 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴.   (A25) 
Case 2b: the principal ‘misbehaved’ and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = (0.023 − 0.111) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 0.023 + 0.111) ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,  (A26) 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = −0.088 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 + 1.088 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴.   (A27) 
Considering that equations (A17) and (A18) must also be satisfied for the Charness and Rabin 
model for agents to accept an offered contract and to reveal an effort level of 20, the following 
will analyse the three different contract types in detail. Note that the Charness and Rabin (2002) 
utility function is not differentiable at 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃. In the following analysis we therefore use 
numerical simulations to derive predictions. 
 
Trust contract 
Anticipating that the agent will set his effort level in order to maximize his (inequality averse) 
utility function, the principal decides on the size of the fixed wage 𝐹𝐹. For sufficiently high 
values of 𝜌𝜌, 𝜎𝜎 and 𝜃𝜃, it would no longer be advantageous to shirk and exert 𝑒𝑒 = 0, as in the 
selfish payoff maximizing prediction. Using the empirically estimated parameters of Charness 
and Rabin’s (2002) paper (see above), the agent should always exert an effort level 𝑒𝑒 > 0, even 
in the case of 𝐹𝐹 = 0.10 If the agent followed a Charness and Rabin utility function and the 
principal offered fixed wages in excess of 1660, the agent would respond with an effort level 
of 20. This assumes that any 𝐹𝐹 > 0 was interpreted as ‘well behaved’ by the agent. In contrast, 
assuming that ‘no fixed wage was good enough’, i.e. the principals ‘misbehaved’ in Charness 
                                                 
10 In the case of 𝐹𝐹 = 0, the agent would exert 𝑒𝑒 = 1. This is contract independent and therefore also valid for the 
bonus and the revenue sharing contract. Consequently, all offered contracts should be accepted by agents under 
the assumption of the parameter estimates of Charness and Rabin (2002). 
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and Rabin’s language, only minimally changes the results. In this case the necessary minimum 
fixed wage that would be high enough to make the agent exert 𝑒𝑒 = 20 would rise to 1686. 
Regarding the prediction stability a robustness check of the parameters reveals that even rather 
severe deviations from the original estimations cause little change. Assuming that 𝜌𝜌 = 0.212, 
increases the minimum fixed wage that made the agent exert 𝑒𝑒 = 20 to 1710, resulting in an 
entirely equal split.11 Only if the agent’s payoff was lower than the principal’s and the agent 
cared very little about the principal’s payoff at all, i.e. 𝜎𝜎 ≤ 0.013, he would not exert a positive 
effort level and shirk (𝑒𝑒 = 0) or reject the offer altogether. Consequently, the principal would 
set 𝐹𝐹 = 0 if she expects the agent’s 𝜎𝜎 ≤ 0.013. 
 
Bonus contract 
Similarly to the case of pure payoff maximizers, the actually paid bonus is expected to be zero, 
as any announced bonus will be regarded as cheap talk, independent of the agent’s utility 
function. Hence, the principals will always set 𝐵𝐵 = 0. The prediction only depends on the 
preferences of the agent. If the agent had Charness and Rabin preferences, he would – similarly 
to the trust contract – respond to any levels of fixed wages by adapting his effort level. 
Consequently, if a principal expects an agent to have Charness and Rabin preferences (such 
that 𝜌𝜌 = 0.424, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.023 and 𝜃𝜃 = −0.111), she would offer a fixed wage of 1660 and the 
agent would respond with 𝑒𝑒 = 20. If the principal expected the agent to be selfish, she would 
offer 𝐹𝐹 = 0 and the agent would respond with 𝑒𝑒 = 0. 
                                                 
11 Note that 𝜌𝜌 = 0.212 equals Charness and Rabin’s (2002) parameter estimate if the model was restricted to 𝜌𝜌 =
𝜎𝜎 and 𝜃𝜃 = 0. 
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Revenue sharing contract 
In the revenue sharing contract the principal offers to pay a fixed wage 𝐹𝐹 and a revenue share 
𝑆𝑆. Remember that entirely selfish payoff maximizing agents would exert 𝑒𝑒 = 20 if 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0.27. 
Using Charness and Rabin’s estimated coefficients a fixed wage of 𝐹𝐹 = 0 and a share of 𝑆𝑆 =0.25 would be sufficient to trigger an effort of 𝑒𝑒 = 20. If the principal assumes that the agent 
follows a Charness and Rabin utility function she should never offer a share larger than 0.25. 
Should the agent be more inequality averse, an even lower share could be offered. Even if the 
principal could not be sure about the agent’s concerns for inequality, setting 𝑆𝑆 = 0.27 would 
be entirely sufficient to result in 𝑒𝑒 = 20, even if the agent was completely selfish. Importantly, 
any offers in excess of 0.27 do not increase efficiency but solely transfer revenue from the 
principal to the agent. Therefore, if the principal assumes that the agent – in line with the 
Charness and Rabin model – does not attribute much importance to earning less than the 
principal in terms of monetary payoff, we would not expect to see offers in excess of 0.27. This 
is true for principals with entirely selfish and reasonable parameter assumptions for Charness 
and Rabin preferences. 
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B. Experimental Instructions 
General Instructions 
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the following instructions carefully. Reading these 
instructions carefully could earn you a significant amount of money. If you face any difficulties 
understanding any part of the instructions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
to assist you. All the money that you will earn during this experiment will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of this experiment.  
No talking is allowed through the experiment. Please switch off your mobile phones. 
 
Experiment Overview 
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. There 
is a note on your desk clarifying your role. Communication between the two will be via the 
computer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not know with of the other 
participants you are interacting. Interaction will be through contracts. A contract is an offer by 
the employer to the employee for offering a value of effort. The details are discussed below. 
 
The experiment consists of 3 practice stages, and 5 real stages. In the 3 practice stages every 
employer is matched with the same employee. In the real stages, the employer will be matched 
with a different employee in every stage who will also be different from the one he/she 
encountered in the practice stages. The practice stages are to help you familiarise with the 
procedure of the experiment and your choices will not affect your earnings. The following five 
‘real’ stages form the main body of the experiment and your choices will affect your final 
earnings. The 5 real stages consist in total of 14 rounds. At the end of the experiment the 
earnings you made from one of these rounds are randomly chosen by the computer and are 
added to your show up fee. 
 
For attending this experiment you will be given a show up fee of £3. In the experiment you 
will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the experiment the ECU you 
have earned during the experiment will be exchanged at the exchange rate of: 250ECU = £1.  
 For example, 500ECU=£2, 1000ECU=£4, 25ECU= £0.10, 3000= £12. 
 
At the start of each stage a new set of instructions is given to you which, will explain the process 
of the stages that is starting and accompany the instructions for the following stages. 
 
Stage 1: Contract 1 (practice) 
In this round the employer has to decide the size of a fixed wage that he/she wants to pay the 
employee, and set a suggested effort level. The fixed wage can range between 0 and 3000 and 
the suggested effort from 0 to 20. Both the fixed wage and suggested effort are received by the 
employee before he/she decides an effort level. 
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The employee has to choose an effort level which, for every unit of effort the employee 
spends, you earn 150ECU; we call this total revenue. The total revenue=150 x effort (see 
Table 8 below).  
 
At the start of every round both employer and employee are given a capital of 3000ECU this 
money is for you to use within the experiment and are added to your earnings for the round.  
 
There are three key elements you need to note: 
Firstly, for every unit of effort the employee spends, it has a subsequent ECU cost to him. The 
exact cost of ECU for every unit of effort along with other important information is shown in 
Table 8 which is handed in a separate sheet. 
Secondly, the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is not bound 
to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given range of 0 to 20.  
Thirdly, the fixed wage is paid upfront (i.e. before the employee decides an effort level). 
 
How earnings are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the capital plus the total revenue generated by the 
employee’s effort minus the fixed wage he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Profit= Employer capital + Total revenue – fixed wage 
In the case of the employee, his/her profits are his/her capital plus the fixed wage minus the 
cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee’s Profit= Employee capital + fixed wage – cost of effort 
 
The process of the stage is the following:  
0. Before the stage starts, there are four multiple choice quizzes to check that you 
understood what your earnings will be according to your choices. 
 
1. The employer chooses the fixed wage and suggest an effort level to the employee.  
 
2. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. 
 
3. If the employee rejects the contract the stage finishes. If he accepts the contract, he 
receives the offered fixed wage and decides an effort level.  
 
4. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates and informs 
both participants of their profits.  
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Some Examples 
Example 1: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 500ECU, sets suggested 
effort to 20 and the employee decides to accept the offer and offer an effort level of 20. What 
would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: By looking on Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 20 units of effort is 3000 
ECU. So the profits for the employer are 3000ECU (the total revenue) plus the employer capital 
of 3000ECU minus 500ECU (the fixed wage), therefore 5500 ECU. For the employee the 
profits are his/her capital of 450ECU plus 500ECU (the fixed wage) minus the cost for his 
effort which is 420ECU (see Table 8), therefore 3530 ECU. 
 
Example 2: Assume like before that the employer offers a fixed wage of 500ECU and sets a 
suggested effort of 20 and the employee decides to accept the offer and offer an effort level of 
0. What would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: In this case the total revenue is 0ECU. The employer receives only his capital of 3000 
which from 500ECU are subtracted (the fixed wage he/she paid) hence he/she earns 2500 ECU. 
The employee earns 500ECU (the fixed wage) plus his/her capital of 3000ECU therefore he/she 
earns 3500 ECU.  
 
Stage 2: Contract Type 2 (practice) 
Round 2 is identical to round 1 with the only exception that now the employer can also 
announce a bonus to the employee. When the employer offers the contract, except of the fixed 
wage, he/she can also announce a bonus. However, the bonus announcement is non-binding. 
That is, after the earnings for both of you are realised, the employer is free to decide if he/she 
wants to pay a bonus or not and if so of what size. 
Summing up, the employer has to pay a fixed wage upfront, announce a non-binding bonus 
and suggest an effort level. After the employee decides an effort level, the employer has to 
decide the size of the bonus he/she wants to pay. Both fixed wage and bonus can range from 
0ECU to 3000ECU but also the sum of the two (fixed wage and bonus) cannot exceed 
3000ECU.  
 
The process of the stage is the following:  
0. Before the stage starts, there are four multiple choice quizzes to check that you 
understood what your earnings will be according to your choices. 
 
1. The employer chooses the size of the fixed wage, the size of the announced bonus and 
suggests an effort level to the employee.  
 
2. After being informed of the offered contract the employee has to decide either to accept 
or reject the contract. 
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3. If the employee rejects the contract the stage finishes. If he/she accepts the contract, 
receives the offered fixed wage and decides an effort level.  
 
4. After the employee had decided an effort level, the computer calculates and informs 
both employer and employee their profits. At this point the employer will be asked if 
he/she wants to pay a bonus and if so, of what size. Depending on the employer’s 
choice the computer recalculates and informs both of you for your final profits for this 
stage. 
 
How earnings are calculated 
For the employer, his/her earnings are the capital plus the total revenue generated by the 
employee’s effort minus the fixed wage and minus any bonus he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Profit = Employer capital + total revenue – fixed wage – bonus 
In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are the employee capital plus the fixed wage plus 
any bonus minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee’s Profit= Employee capital + fixed wage + bonus – cost of effort 
 
Some Examples 
Example 1: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 500 ECU, announces a 
bonus of 500ECU and sets suggested effort to 20. The employee decides to accept the offer 
and offer an effort level of 20. Then the employer gets informed about the total revenue and 
decides to pay a bonus of 400 ECU. What would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: By looking at Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 20 units of effort is 3000 
ECU. So the profits for the employer are his/her capital of 3000 plus 3000ECU (the total 
revenue) minus 500ECU (the fixed wage), minus the bonus of 400ECU, therefore 2900 ECU. 
For the employee the profits are his/her capital of 3000ECU plus 500ECU (the fixed wage) 
plus the bonus of 400ECU minus the cost for his effort which is 420ECU (see Table 8), 
therefore 3480 ECU. 
 
Example 2: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 700 ECU, announce a bonus 
of 500ECU and sets suggested effort to 20. He observes a total revenue of 1500 ECU. i) What 
was the effort level that the agent chose? ii)If the employer decides to pay a bonus of 0, what 
would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: i) The employer by looking on Table 8 can see that a total revenue of 1500 ECU 
corresponds to an effort level of 10. ii) For a total revenue of 1500 ECU, the employer earns 
his/her capital of 3000 ECU plus 1500 (the total revenue) minus the fixed wage of 700 hence 
his/her profits are 3800 ECU. The employee earns his her capital of 3000 ECU plus 700 ECU 
(the fixed wage) minus the cost of effort for 10 units of effort which is 110 ECU. Thus, the 
employee earns 3590 ECU.  
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Stage 3: Contract Type 3 (practice) 
In this stage the employer instead of a bonus he/she can offer a share of the total revenue to 
the employee. This offer is binding. That is, that as long as the employer has offered a share of 
the total revenue to the employee he/she cannot change the offer. 
For example, a value of 0.09, 0.54 or 0.92 will correspond to 9%, 54% or 92% of the total 
revenue being given to the employee.  
Like before you can also offer a fixed wage, between 0 and 3000, and again you have to suggest 
an effort level. 
The process of the stage is the following:  
0. Before the stage starts, there are four multiple choice quizzes to check that you 
understood what your earnings will be according to your choices. 
 
1. The employer chooses the size of the fixed wage, the size of the share of total revenue 
he/she wants to offer, and suggests an effort level to the employee.  
 
2. After being informed of the offered contract, the employee decides either to accept or 
reject the contract. 
 
3. If the employee rejects the contract the stage finishes and you move to the next stage. 
If he/she accepts the contract he/she receives the offered fixed wage and decides an 
effort level.  
 
4. After the employee had decided an effort level, the computer calculates the total 
revenue, allocates it between the employer and the employee according to the size of 
the share that each of them holds, and informs both about their final profits.  
 
How earnings are calculated 
For the employer, his/her profits are the employer capital, the total revenue generated by the 
employee’s effort minus the fixed wage, minus the share of the total revenue he/she offered to 
the employee. In other words: 
Employer’s Profit= Employer capital + total revenue – fixed wage – share * total revenue 
In the case of the employee, his/her profits are the employee capital, plus the fixed wage plus 
the share on the total revenue that has been offered to him/her, minus the cost of effort. In other 
words:  
Employee’s Profit= Employee capital + fixed wage + share * total revenue – cost of effort 
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Some Examples 
Example 1: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 200ECU, offer a share of 
0.2, and set suggested effort to 15. The employee decides to accept the offer and offer an effort 
level of 20. What would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: By looking on Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 20 units of effort is 3000 
ECU. So the profits for the employer are 3000ECU (the total revenue) minus 100 ECU (the 
fixed wage), minus the share (0.2 x 3000 =600), therefore 2300 ECU plus the employer capital 
of 3000 ECU hence 5300 ECU. For the employee the profits are the employee capital of 3000 
ECU, plus 100 ECU (the fixed wage) plus the share of 600 ECU minus the cost for his effort 
which is 420 ECU (see Table 8), therefore, 3280 ECU. 
 
Example 2: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 0ECU, offer a share of 0.6, 
and set suggested effort to 20. The employee decides to accept the offer and offer an effort 
level of 18. What would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: By looking on Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 18 units of effort is 2700 
ECU. So the profits for the employer are 2700 ECU (the total revenue), minus the share (0.6 x 
2700 =1620) plus his capital of 3000 ECU, therefore 4080 ECU (2700-1620=1080 +3000). For 
the employee the profits are the share of 1620ECU minus the cost for his effort which is 342 
ECU (see Table 8) plus his/her capital of 450, hence, 4278 ECU. 
Note: to make your calculations easier recall that a percentage of say 2%, 20%, 100%, its equal 
to 0.02, 0.2 and 1 respectively.  
 
Stage 4: Contract Type 1 
From now on your choices affect your earnings. You should keep in mind the clock on the 
top right side of the screen and comply with the time constraints 
This stage is the same as stage 1 but this time your choices affect your earnings. For how 
earnings are calculated or for the procedures of the stage you should recall on the instruction 
sheet that was given to you at the start of stage 1. 
Reminder 
Type 1: Fixed Wage 
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Stage 5: Contract Type 2 
This stage is the same as stage 2 but this time your choices affect your earnings. For how 
earnings are calculated or for the procedures of the stage you should recall on the instruction 
sheet that was given to you at the start of stage 2. 
Reminder 
Type 2: Fixed Wage + Bonus 
 
Stage 6: Contract Type 3 
This stage is the same as stage 3 but this time your choices affect your earnings. For how 
earnings are calculated or for the procedures of the stage you should recall on the instruction 
sheet that was given to you at the start of stage 3. 
Reminder 
Type 3: Fixed Wage + Share 
 
Stage 7: Choice among the 3 Contracts 
In this stage the employer is given the option to choose between the three possible contracts 
that you experienced before. Therefore, he/she firstly has to choose which of the three contracts 
he/she want to use and the rest of the stage follows exactly as in the corresponding stage you 
participated earlier.  
Reminder 
Type 1: Fixed Wage 
Type 2: Fixed Wage + Bonus 
Type 3: Fixed wage + Share 
 
The process of the stage is the following:  
 
1. The employer chooses one of the three contracts. 
 
2. The remaining procedure is identical to the corresponding contract you practiced with 
before. 
For any queries on how earnings are calculated see the instructions that were provided to you. 
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Stage 8: Choice between the 3 Contracts - repeated interaction 
This stage is identical to stage 4 with only difference that is consisted of 6 rounds in which you 
are paired with the same participant. In each round the employer has to choose one of the three 
contracts and according to his/her choice the stage continues. 
Note: At the start of every round both the employer’s and employee’s capitals are refreshed. 
In addition, if a contract is rejected the stage is not finished but you move to the next round of 
the stage. 
Reminder 
Type 1: Fixed Wage 
Type 2: Fixed Wage + Bonus 
Type 3: Fixed wage + Share 
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Table 8: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Total Revenue 
 
 
 
 
Effort Level Cost of Effort Total Revenue 
0 0 0 
1 2 150 
2 6 300 
3 12 450 
4 20 600 
5 30 750 
6 42 900 
7 56 1050 
8 72 1200 
9 90 1350 
10 110 1500 
11 132 1650 
12 156 1800 
13 182 1950 
14 210 2100 
15 240 2250 
16 272 2400 
17 306 2550 
18 342 2700 
19 380 2850 
20 420 3000 
 
 
Employer Capital: 3000 ECU 
Employee Capital: 3000 ECU 
25 
 
C. General Descriptive Statistics, Bonus Payments and Revealed Effort 
Table C1: Descriptive Statistics of the Experiment 
    Exogenous contract   TBR    TBR-r: all rounds 
    TC BC RSC   TC BC RSC   TC BC RSC 
n   72 72 72   3 15 54   19 90 323 
Mean F 695 504 188   500 791 115   952 573 125 
Mean B - 151 -   - 127 -   - 420 - 
Mean S - - 0.354   - - 0.395   - - 0.378 
Mean es 14.78 18.19 18.78   9.33 18.80 19.61   18.00 18.39 19.49 
Mean e 4.92 8.68 14.92   1.33 9.47 15.93   5.42 11.27 16.50 
    TBR-r: round 1   TBR-r: round 2   TBR-r: round 3 
    TC BC RSC   TC BC RSC   TC BC RSC 
n   5 16 51   4 17 51   3 18 51 
Mean F 1520 698 105   900 584 160   475 673 171 
Mean B - 576 -   - 595 -   - 416 - 
Mean S - - 0.375   - - 0.361   - - 0.358 
Mean es 19.60 18.00 19.06   14.00 18.29 19.55   19.33 16.67 19.39 
Mean e   6.60 12.12 17.57   2.75 12.24 16.49   7.00 10.67 13.80 
    TBR-r: round 4   TBR-r: round 5   TBR-r: round 6 
    TC BC RSC   TC BC RSC   TC BC RSC 
n   5 13 54   1 17 54   1 9 62 
Mean F 1014 544 152   200 465 98   200 374 76 
Mean B - 423 -   - 312 -   - 23 - 
Mean S - - 0.366   - - 0.394   - - 0.405 
Mean es 19.20 19.54 19.56   19.00 19.41 19.74   15.00 19.11 19.61 
Mean e 7.40 11.62 16.13   0.00 9.71 17.35   1.00 11.56 17.45 
 All games          
 TC BC RSC         
n 94 177 449         
Mean F 741 563 134         
Mean B - 286 -         
Mean S - - 0.376         
Mean es 15.26 18.34 19.39         
Mean e 4.9 10.06  16.18         
Notes: n: number of choices (1 for each subject in TC-ex, BC-ex, RSC-ex; or dependent on contract choice by the 
principal in the TBR and TBR-r); F: fixed wage; B: bonus in the BC only; S: share of revenue to go to agent in 
RSC; es: suggested effort; e: effort.  
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Table C2: Theoretical Predictions and Experimental Results for Distribution of 
Generated Surplus in the Revenue sharing Contract 
    
Expected 
profit 
Relative 
share    
Average 
profit 
Relative 
share 
Self 
Interest 
Principal 2190 85%  Results 
RSC-
ex 
Principal 1206 62% 
Agent 390 15%  Agent 741 38% 
Difference   70%  Difference   24% 
Inequity 
averse 
agent 
Principal 1440 56%  
Results 
TBR 
Principal 1269 61% 
Agent 1140 44%  Agent 806 39% 
Difference   12%  Difference   22% 
     
Results 
TBR-r 
Principal 1359 63% 
     Agent 786 37% 
     Difference   26% 
Notes: RSC-ex denotes an exogenously determined one shot revenue sharing contract. TBR and TBR-r represent 
contract choice situations in a one shot and repeated game, respectively. 
Table C3: Actual bonus payments in bonus contracts 
Dependent Variable: Bonus Payment  
Constant 154.139 
(196.942) 
Revealed effort 34.254** 
(13.184) 
Effort demand exceeded -185.416 
(401.613) 
Fixed wage -0.220 
(0.145) 
Announced bonus -0.007 
(0.126) 
Revealed effort x Effort demand exceeded 13.531 
(24.274) 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a linear regression model 
for accepted bonus contracts in repeated contract choice settings (TBR-r) only (with random intercepts at subjects 
nested in sessions). Number of Observations: 80. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% level. 
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Table C4: Average total revenue by game and contract type 
  Trust Contract Bonus Contract Revenue sharing 
C t t TC-ex 738 (72) - - 
BC-ex - 1302 (94) - 
RSC-ex - - 2238 (91) 
TBR  200 (63) 1420 (243) 2389 (96) 
TBR-r 813 (181) 1690 (89) 2476 (38) 
Notes: Means, standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table C5: Determinants of Agents’ Effort for Accepted Contracts: Multi-level panel 
regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  all all RSC only BC only 
BC 3.468*** 7.462***     
  (0.789) (1.375)     
RSC 8.639*** 12.24***     
  (0.880) (1.314)     
Suggested effort 0.484*** 0.0410 0.332* 0.370* 
  (0.0740) (0.126) (0.148) (0.156) 
Fixed wage 0.0000219 0.00462*** -0.000211 0.00410*** 
  (0.000595) (0.00127) (0.000915) (0.00123) 
Exogenous contract -1.616* -0.507 -1.517 -2.536 
  (0.790) (1.571) (0.857) (1.784) 
Game TBI -0.889 -1.831 -1.164 -2.325 
  (0.878) (3.446) (0.815) (2.234) 
Overall round 0.00416 -0.00965 -0.00855 -0.161 
  (0.0899) (0.0878) (0.108) (0.188) 
Round within game TBI-r -0.0953 -0.0877 -0.158 -0.296 
  (0.177) (0.173) (0.173) (0.452) 
BC x fixed wage   -0.00294     
    (0.00160)     
BC x suggested effort   0.484**     
    (0.174)     
RSC x fixed wage   -0.00746***     
    (0.00164)     
RSC x suggested effort   0.770***     
    (0.211)     
Exogenous contract x BC   -1.665     
    (1.744)     
Exogenous contract x RSC   -0.558     
    (1.664)     
Game TBI x BC   0.0958     
    (3.785)     
Game TBI x RSC   0.986     
    (3.522)     
Share     8.321**   
      (2.663)   
Incentive compatible share     3.493***   
      (0.871)   
Announced bonus       0.00424*** 
        (0.000989) 
Constant 8.401*** 4.189** 15.21*** 9.049*** 
  (0.908) (1.395) (0.650) (1.521) 
Observations 656 656 418 155 
Log. Likelihood -2047.4 -2028.7 -1206.9 -503.7 
AIC 4116.9 4095.4 2435.8 1029.5 
BIC 4166.2 4180.7 2480.2 1063.0 
Notes: The baseline condition for the estimations in columns 1 and 2 was TC in the game TBR-r. Columns 3 and 
4 were estimated using only RSC and BC observations, respectively. The table contains coefficients of linear 
regressions with random intercepts on subjects nested in sessions to control for the non-independence of 
observations. All variables that were interacted with BC or RSC (i.e. fixed wage, announced bonus, suggested 
effort, share, incentive compatible share, exogenous contract and exogenous games first) were subtracted off 
their means before estimating the models. BC and RSC are dummies for the bonus and the revenue sharing 
contract, respectively. TBR and TBR-r indicate one shot and repeated games with endogenous contract choice 
by the principal. The dummy incentive compatible share is one if the principal offered a share ≥ 0.27, the lowest 
share that satisfied the incentive compatibility constraint, and zero otherwise.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% level.  
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Table C6: Determinants of Agents’ Effort for Accepted Contracts: Tobit panel 
regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  all all RSC only BC only 
BC 2.345** 5.553***     
  (0.781) (1.420)     
RSC 7.034*** 10.07***     
  (0.925) (1.414)     
Suggested effort 0.460*** 0.0995 0.229 0.324* 
  (0.0783) (0.130) (0.119) (0.163) 
Fixed wage -0.000762 0.00296* -0.000443 0.00382** 
  (0.000600) (0.00128) (0.000714) (0.00129) 
Exogenous contract -1.213 0.601 -0.984 -2.972 
  (0.853) (1.626) (0.752) (1.899) 
Game TBI -1.020 0.769 -1.276 -2.035 
  (0.966) (3.437) (0.737) (2.392) 
Overall round -0.0367 -0.0480 0.0225 -0.0747 
  (0.0944) (0.0925) (0.0966) (0.194) 
Round within game TBI-r 0.0762 0.0576 -0.0684 -0.310 
  (0.200) (0.197) (0.161) (0.495) 
BC x fixed wage   -0.00181     
    (0.00159)     
BC x suggested effort   0.278     
    (0.173)     
RSC x fixed wage   -0.00654***     
    (0.00167)     
RSC x suggested effort   0.801***     
    (0.214)     
Exogenous contract x BC   -2.072     
    (1.767)     
Exogenous contract x RSC   -1.377     
    (1.732)     
Game TBI x BC   -1.703     
    (3.770)     
Game TBI x RSC   -2.249     
    (3.525)     
Share     8.853***   
      (2.577)   
Incentive compatible share     1.651*   
      (0.773)   
Announced bonus       0.00438*** 
        (0.00109) 
Observations 656 656 418 155 
Left-censored (at 0) 53 53 12 15 
Uncensored 286 286 128 103 
Right-censored (at 20) 317 317 278 37 
Log. Likelihood -1296.6 -1277.4 -606.2 -417.3 
AIC 2609.1 2586.8 1228.4 848.7 
BIC 2645.0 2658.6 1260.7 870.0 
Notes: The baseline condition for the estimations in columns 1 and 2 was TC in the game TBR-r. Columns 3 and 
4 were estimated using only RSC and BC observations, respectively. The table contains marginal effects of Tobit 
regressions with random intercepts on subject level. All variables that were interacted with BC or RSC (i.e. fixed 
wage, announced bonus, suggested effort, share, incentive compatible share, exogenous contract and exogenous 
games first) were subtracted off their means before estimating the models. BC and RSC are dummies for the 
bonus and the revenue sharing contract, respectively. TBR and TBR-r indicate one shot and repeated games with 
endogenous contract choice by the principal. The dummy incentive compatible share is one if the principal 
offered a share ≥ 0.27, the lowest share that satisfied the incentive compatibility constraint, and zero otherwise.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% level.  
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D. Contract parameters chosen by principals 
Figure D1: Trust contract parameters (for TC-ex, TBR and TBR-r separately) 
 
 
 
Notes: The panels are histograms of fixed wage offers for trust contracts in each of TC-ex, TBR and TBR-r. 
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Figure D2: Bonus contract parameters (for BC-ex, TBR and TBR-r separately) 
 
 
 
Notes: The panels are scatterplots of the announced bonuses (circles) and actual bonuses (triangles) against the 
corresponding fixed wages for bonus contracts in each of BC-ex, TBR and TBR-r.  
32 
 
Figure D3: Revenue sharing contract parameters (for BC-ex, TBR and TBR-r 
separately) 
 
Notes: The panels are scatterplots of scatterplot of the offered shares against the fixed wage for revenue sharing 
contracts in each of RSC-ex, TBR and TBR-r.  
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Figure D4: Trust contract parameters over time 
Notes: Fixed wage was scaled down to 1/100 to fit in the plot with revealed effort (unscaled). The revealed effort 
by the agents is significantly positively correlated with the fixed wage offered by the principals (Spearman: 
ρ=0.319, p=0.051). 
 
Figure D5: Bonus contract parameters over time 
 
Notes: Fixed wage, announced bonus and actual bonus were scaled down to 1/100 to fit in the plot with revealed 
effort (unscaled). Note that the difference between the initially announced and the actually paid out bonus by 
principals grows bigger over time from 242 to 1381 ECU (Spearman correlation with TBR-r round: ρ=0.829, 
p=0.058). 
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Figure D6: Revenue sharing contract parameters over time 
 
 
Notes: Fixed wage was scaled down to 1/10 and revenue share was scaled up to x50 to fit in the plot with revealed 
effort (unscaled). The shares offered by principals and the effort revealed by agents are strongly correlated 
(Spearman: ρ=0.444, p<0.001). 
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E. Evolution and profitability of contract choices over time 
Figure E1: Relative frequencies of changing the contract in TBR-r games 
 
Notes: In each period on average over 74.4% of principals keep the contract they chose in the previous round. 
Only 3.1%, 9.7% and 12.8% of principals switched to TC, BC and RSC respectively. 
Figure E2: Profits for principals and agents, by keeping/switching the contract type and 
TBR-r round 
 
Notes: By design only principals could choose between contracts. Agents-keep and Agents-switch refer to the 
profits of agents whose principals chose to keep or switch their contract from one TBR-r round to the next, 
respectively. Principals who kept the contract of their previous round earned significantly more than those who 
switched contracts between rounds (Wilcoxon test: p<0.001). This is not the case for agents (p=0.544). 
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Figure E3: Relative frequencies of changing the contract in TBR-r games for each 
principal 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the number of times each principal on average proposed a different contract than in the 
previous TBR-r period. 43.1% chose one and the same contract throughout all 6 TBR-r periods. 16.7% chose to 
switch contracts 1, 2 or 3 times each and 6.9% of principals chose to switch contracts 4 times in total. Not a single 
principal switched the maximum of 5 times. 
Figure E4: Profits for principals and agents, by the frequency of changing contracts 
 
Notes: Principals are on average better off than agents, irrespective the number of times they switch between 
contract types. There is no clear pattern indicating that changing contract types more frequently would either 
positively or negatively affect profits of principals or agents. 
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Figure E5: Relative frequencies of using 1, 2 or all 3 contracts in TBR-r games for each 
principal  
 
Notes: The two leftmost bars represent the relative frequency of choosing BC or RSC throughout all TBR-r 
periods, i.e. 4.2% and 38.9% proposed only BCs and RSCs, respectively. Not a single principal used only TCs 
throughout. Some principals changed between two contracts, but never used the third option (see two middle bars). 
5.6% proposed at least one TC and at least one RSC whereas and 40.3% proposed at least one BC and one RSC. 
Not a single principal used at least one TC and one BC. A minority of principals (11.1%) chose to try all three 
different contracts. 
Figure E6: Profits for principals and agents in TBR-r games by chosen contract types 
and number of contracts used 
 
Notes: On aggregate, it is advantageous for principals to use one or two, but not three different contracts. This is 
driven by the fact that agents typically get a bigger share of the joint profits in trust contract settings and thus 
principals are better off avoiding this contract. As expected, principals earned the most when choosing the RSC 
throughout (Wilcoxon tests: RSC only vs BC only, p=0.013 and RSC only  BC/RSC, p<0.001). However, there 
is no clear cut second best situation with respect to principals’ profits.  The principals’ profits in the case of a 
mixture of RSC with BC (in the sense of mixing the most efficient with the second best contract) are not 
significantly different from the case of sticking to BC throughout (p=0.801). 
